

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03993 01 OF 03 290859Z

12

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CU-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 ACDA-05 SAJ-01 BIB-01 TRSE-00 /077 W

----- 103261

R 281848Z MAY 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3316

INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 296

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 GENEVA 3993

NOFORN

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR TAGS AND SUBJECT

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE PFOR XG

SUBJECT: CSCE: SOME THOUGHTS ON WHERE WE ARE GOING

USNATO ALSO FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

1. SUMMARY: THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOW ENTERED THEIR LONG-EXPECTED CRUNCH. BEFORE BECOMING WHOLLY ABSORBED IN THIS FINAL NEGOTIATING EFFORT WE HAVE TRIED TO DRAW ON OUR EXPERIENCE, AND TO SET DOWN SOME SHORT AND LONGER-TERM REFLECTIONS REGARDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CSCE PROCESS FOR EUROPE, AND OF THE KIND OF EUROPE WE AND OUR ALLIES MAY BE CONFRONTED WITH IN THE COMING YEARS. FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF OUR INTENSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE WE STILL BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A GOOD CASE TO BE MADE IN FAVOR OF SOME CONTINUING CSCE PROCESS, PROVIDED WESTERN UNITY CAN BE MAINTAINED. HOWEVER, WE ALSO SEE POTENTIAL DANGERS AHEAD AND WOULD STRESS THAT IT WILL BE A CONSIDERABLE TIME UNTIL ALL THE CARDS ARE IN AND A DEFINITIVE JUDGEMENT ON CSCE CAN BE MADE. WE END THIS TELEGRAM WITH SOME TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE US POLICY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03993 01 OF 03 290859Z

END SUMMARY.

2. BARRING LAST MINUTE DERAILEMENT THERE IS LITTLE QUESTION THAT CSCE HAS BECOME A MAJOR ELEMENT OF THE DETENTE PROCESS IN EUROPE. LOOKED AT IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS, IT HAS BROUGHT TOGETHER EAST AND WEST, ALLIES AND NEUTRALS IN THE LARGEST EXCHANGE OF IDEAS IN POST-WORLD WAR II HISTORY. THE EXPECTED SUMMIT IN HELSINKI WILL BE THE MOST FAR-REACHING OF ALL-EUROPEAN GATHERINGS OF GOVERNMENT LEADERS SINCE VERSAILLES. THE SCOPE OF THE AGENDA IS THE MOST EXTENSIVE OF ANY SUCH MEETING SINCE WORLD WAR II. MOREOVER, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 35 NATIONS INVOLVED HAVE MADE VARYING DEGREES OF EFFORT OVER A TWO YEAR PERIOD TO LEARN TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S VIEWS, TO COMMUNICATE ACROSS TRADITIONAL BARRIERS, AND TO PERSIST UNTIL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN HAMMERED OUT.

3. ALL THIS HAS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE, PRACTICAL AND SYMBOLIC IMPLICATIONS. FOR THE FIRST TIME THE NON-COMMUNIST EUROPEAN AND THE ATLANTIC STATES HAVE JOINTLY INDICATED, THROUGH THEIR ATTENDANCE AT THIS CONFERENCE, THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO TREAT COLLECTIVELY WITH THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES. FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTICIPANTS THIS MEANS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, AN INDIRECT BUT SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARDS LEGITIMIZATION OF THEIR POST-WORLD WAR II TERRITORIAL GAINS AND A FURTHER ASSURANCE OF THE PERMANENT DIVISION OF GERMANY. IT MEANS PUBLIC CONFIRMATION THAT WESTERN ABHORRENCE OF PAST (AND PRESENT) SOVIET BLOC INTERNAL EXCESSES IS RECEDING; THAT THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ARE BECOMING ACCEPTED, NOT JUST AS ECONOMIC PARTNERS BUT AS CONDITIONAL MEMBERS IN A BROADER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY BASED ON COMITY; AND, FOR THE PRESUMED MAJORITY IN MOSCOW SUPPORTING THE BREZHNEV FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH, IT IS A FURTHER KEY PROOF OF HIS SUCCESS AND MERIT.

4. FOR THE WEST, THE CSCE PROCESS MAY ALSO BRING NEW COLLECTIVE ADVANTAGES, IN SETTING THE STAGE FOR EXPANDED HUMAN CONTACTS, AND AN EASING OF THE ATMOSPHERE, BOTH IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FIELDS, HOWEVER, THE BURDEN OF IMPLEMENTING CSCE DECISIONS WILL FALL PRIMARILY ON THE COMMUNIST

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03993 01 OF 03 290859Z

SIDE. FOR IN RETURN FOR ADVANTAGES GAINED, THE WARSAW PACT IS IN THE PROCESS OF ACCEPTING A CERTAIN MORTGAGING OF ITS FUTURE BEHAVIOR -- ALTHOUGH EXACTLY HOW SIGNIFICANT THAT MORTGAGE WILL BE IS THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF OUR CURRENT, INCREASINGLY TOUGH, FINAL NEGOTIATIONS. JUDGING FROM PAST SOVIET BEHAVIOUR, FOR INSTANCE ON BERLIN, THIS CONTROVERSY OF HOW THE SOVIETS WILL INTERPRET THE CSCE OBLIGATIONS WILL CONTINUE IN THE POST-

CSCE YEARS, PARTICULARLY IF THE WEST TRIES TO HOLD THEIR FEET TO THE FIRE, AND THE FIRE IS LARGE ENOUGH TO HAVE REAL MEANING.

5. FOR THE NEUTRALS, THAT IS FOR THOSE OUTSIDE THE NINE, THE FIFTEEN AND THE WARSAW PACT, AS WELL AS THE DISSIDENT COMMUNIST STATES LIKE ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA -- CSCE HAS ALSO BEEN BOTH A PROMISING AND FRUSTRATING EXPERIENCE. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE IN SOME WAYS OBTAINING A GOOD DEAL LESS THAN THEY HAD HOPED, THEY ARE AT LEAST BEING ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MAJOR LEAGUES. FOR SOME, LIKE ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA, THE CSCE PROCESS LOOKS LIKE A NEW LIFELINE, TO WHICH THEY CAN TRY TO CLING IF SOVIET PRESSURES ARE RENEWED. TO OTHERS, LIKE THE MEDITERRANEAN STATES, IT IS A HOPEFULLY CONTINUING MEANS OF PURSUING NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS, ALBEIT WITH POTENTIALLY DEVISIVE OVERTONES, I.E. MALTA'S DRIVE FOR A MEDITERRANEAN "IDENTITY" AND SPECIAL MEDITERRANEAN-ARAB LINKS. FOR STILL OTHERS, LIKE SOME OF THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES, CSCE PROVIDES NEW INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS TO PRESS POLITICAL IDEAS AND HUMANITARIAN AND IDEOLOGICAL DEMANDS, PARTLY FOR THEIR OWN DOMESTIC REASONS. TAKEN TOGETHER, THE NON-ALIGNED AND NEUTRALS HAVE FOUND IN CSCE THE FIRST COMPREHENSIVE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THEY CAN PRESENT AND WORK FOR THEIR SPECIFIC INTERESTS.

6. IN SUM, THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE WORKED SO FAR BECAUSE, UP TO THIS POINT AT LEAST, THE ADVANTAGES OF GOING ALONG HAVE SEEMED TO OUTWEIGH THE DISADVANTAGES, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY IN EACH SUBJECT AREA. THE QUESTION OF THE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03993 02 OF 03 282153Z

62

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CU-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 ACDA-05 SAJ-01 BIB-01 TRSE-00 /077 W

----- 095779

R 281848Z MAY 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3317  
INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 297

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 GENEVA 3993

NOFORN

USNATO ALSO FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM FUTURE IS WHETHER THIS IS LIKELY  
TO CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE; AND, IF SO, UNDER WHAT  
CONDTIONS AND TO WHAT EXTENT.

7. IT IS ON THIS SCORE THAT WE ARE A GOOD DEAL LESS  
CONFIDENT. A MULTILATERALLY ADVANTAGEOUS CONTINUATION  
OF THE CSCE PROCESS, AND MAINTENCE OF THE MOMENTUM  
OF MULTILATERAL POLITICAL DETENTE IN EUROPE, WILL DEPEND IN THE  
FIRST INSTANCE ON THE KIND OF DEAL WHICH IS STRUCK NOW IN  
THE FINAL STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS. BEYOND THAT, IN THE  
"FOLLOW-UP", CSCE'S DESIRABILITY  
WILL IN LARGE PAR BE A FUNCTION OF THE WEST'S ABILITY  
TO MAINTAIN ITS UNITY, TO RENEW ITS COHESION AND TO RE-  
SIST THE TEMPTATIONS OF SOVIET TACTICS OF PEDDLING  
DETENTE FOR DETENTE'S SAKE, WHILE PROBING FOR WEAKNESSES  
AND DIVISIONS. NONE OF THESE IN OUR VIEW ARE FORE-  
GONE CONCLUSIONS.

8. CSCE'S IMMEDIATE HURDLE WILL, OF COURSE, BE THE DEAL  
WE WORK OUT HERE IN THE COMING WEEKS. AS FAR AS THE  
SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED, THERE ARE NO SIGNS SO  
FAR THAT THEIR BASIC NEGOTIATING AIMS HAVE CHANGED. AFTER  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03993 02 OF 03 282153Z

TWO YEARS IN GENEVA IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT PEACEFUL CO-  
EXISTENCE, DETENTE AND EAST-WEST COOPERATION MEAN LITTLE  
MORE TO THEM THAN A NEW MEANS TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM AD-  
VANTAGES WHILE CONTINUING TO EXPAND THEIR INFULENCE  
THROUGH OTHER MEANS. IN CSCE THEY FIRST SOUGHT TO  
CONSOLIDATE WHAT DE FACTO THEY ALREADY HAD, THEN TO  
GAIN NEW AREAS OF INFLUENCE, WHILE TRYING TO EXCLUDE  
THOSE INITIATIVES, PARTICULARLY IN BASKET III, WHICH  
COULD CREATE INTERNATL DIFFICULTIES FOR THEMSELVES.  
NOW, TO BRING THE CONFERENCE TO A RAPID CONCLUSION,  
THEY ARE USING EVERY POSSIBLE TECHNIQUE -- SUCH AS  
APPEALS FROM POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE WEST, IMPLIED  
THREATS OF THE "CONSEQUENCES" OF FAILURE, AND IN-  
CREASINGLY HEAVY-HANDED PRESSURING OF OUR OWN AND OTHER  
DELEGATIONS. THE OBJECT IS OBVIOUSLY TO SEE WHETHER  
THE WEST'S MINIMAL POSITIONS CAN BE CRACKED -- AN  
OUTCOME WHICH WOULD RESULT NOT ONLY IN ADDITIONAL  
SUBSTANTIVE GAINS FOR THE USSR, BUT IN INEVITABLE LOSS

OF UNITY AND SELF-CONFIDENCE AMONG THE WESTERN ALLIES. FOR THE EUROPEANS, AND FOR THE CSCE PROCESS IN THE LONGER TERM, SUCH AN UNEVEN OUTCOME WOULD, OF COURSE, NO LONGER REFLECT A SITUATION OF GENUINE DETENTE I.E. OF A MUTUALITY OF CONCESSIONS, BUT WOULD PROBABLY BE SEEN, RETROSPECTIVELY, AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARD WEST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT TO THE IDEA OF SOVIET PRE-DOMINANCE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.

9. SO FAR THE NINE AND THE FIFTEEN HAVE, BY AND LARGE (AND WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS), HELD THEIR GROUND ON THE KEY ISSUES. THEY HAVE DONE SO IN LARGE PART OUT OF GENUINE CONVICTION. HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT THEY ARE ALSO GREATLY ENCOURAGED AND HELPED IN DOING SO BY THE FACT THAT WE OURSELVES ARE AT THIS STAGE BEING JUST AS FIRM (I.E. THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT ON CSCE IN HIS MAY 24 PRESS CONFERENCE) AND ARE FULLY SHARING WITH THEM THE BRUNT OF THESE CONFRONTATIONS,

10. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, OBVIOUS RISKS IN DECLINING TO CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO SPLIT ALL THE DIFFERENCES WITH THE RUSSIANS. IT IS ARGUED THAT THE CONTINUING INABILITY OF THE USSR TO MAKE THE FEW CONCESSIONS  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03993 02 OF 03 282153Z

NECESSARY TO GET THEIR MUCH-DESIRED JULY CSCE SUMMIT SUGGESTS THE EXISTENCE OF CLEAVAGES IN MOSCOW, NOT AS TO SOVIET GOALS, BUT AS TO CURRENT TACTICS. IF BREZHNEV SUCCEEDS PARTICULARLY IF HE SUCCEEDS QUICKLY IN GETTING HIS YEARNED-FOR CSCE SUMMIT, THIS ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THAT HIS BRAND OF SOFT-SELL DETENTE WILL PROBABLY BE PERPETUATED. IF HE FAILS, OR A DELAYED CSCE SUMMIT IS TOO GRUDGINGLY ARRIVED AT, DETENTE SOVIET VERSION COULD, ACCORDING TO THIS SYLLOGISM, BE IN QUESTION, AND A NEW PERHAPS COLDER BREEZE COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE EAST.

11. EVEN IF ALL THIS WERE TRUE, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT FOR THE WEST THE LONG-TERM RISKS ARE NOW MUCH GREATER ON THE OTHER SIDE, I.E. IF WE WERE TO GET WHITTLED DOWN AND SPLIT APART AT THIS STAGE, TO THE POINT WHERE A SUMMIT BECOMES DIFFICULT TO DEFEND TO THE WESTERN PUBLIC, AND WHERE, FROM THE AVERAGE MAN'S POINT OF VIEW, CSCE IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FOLLOW-UP WERE TO BE LARGELY A MATTER OF RECOGNIZING SOVIET GAINS. THE WEST HAS ALREADY MADE EXTENSIVE CSCE CONCESSIONS TO MOSCOW IN THE LAST TWO YEARS. TO PAY MUCH MORE NOW, IN THE PERHAPS FORLORN HOPE OF INFLUENCING SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS SO AS TO INSURE SOVIET GOOD WILL SEEMS TO US EXCESSIVE AND UNWISE. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT CONTINUED FIRMNESS IN THE COMING WEEKS,

AND EVEN OCCASIONAL US LEADERSHIP, MAY BE AN INDISPENSABLE  
PRECONDITION TO ASSURING, NOT JUST AN EVEN-HANDED OUT-  
COME, BUT THE MEANINGFUL CONTINUATION OF THIS KEY EAST-  
WEST PROCESS AND OF DETENTE.

12. FOR THE LONGER TERM, WHATEVER SIGNIFICANCE CSCE  
MAY HAVE WILL DEPEND AS MUCH ON THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN  
EUROPE AND ITS ATLANTIC CONTEXT AS ON ANY OTHER FACTOR.  
FROM OUR, PERHAPS LIMITED, PERSPECTIVE, EUROPE NOW SEEMS  
NOT MERELY FIGURATIVELY, BUT LITERALLY TO BE APPROACH-  
ING A MAJOR TURNING POINT. THE CLEAR LINES BETWEEN EAST  
AND WEST OF AN EARLIER TIME ARE GONE OR FAST ERODING.  
THE FEAR OF DIRECT SOVIET ACTION IN WESTERN EUROPE IS, RIGHTLY  
OR WRONGLY, LESS PALPABLE. SOVIET POLITICAL AMBITIONS  
ARE SUBTLER, AND THEREFORE MORE FREQUENTLY MISUNDERSTOOD.  
THE RESULTS ARE EROSION OF POLITICAL WILL, DECLINE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 GENEVA 03993 02 OF 03 282153Z

DEFENSE BUDGETS AND GROWING CREDULITY AS TO SOVIET  
MOTIVES. THERE ARE ALSO NEW POLITICAL FACTORS, I.E.  
THE DANGEROUS DECLINE IN INTERNAL STABILITY IN THE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03993 03 OF 03 282218Z

62

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CU-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 ACDA-05 SAJ-01 BIB-01 TRSE-00 /077 W

----- 096176

R 281848Z MAY 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3318

INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 298

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 GENEVA 3993

NOFORN

USNATO ALSO FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SOUTHERN TIER; A NEW ASSERTIVENESS BY THE SMALLER, PARTICULARLY THE MORE NEUTRAL STATES; AND THE INTAGIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DROP IN AMERICAN PRESTIGE. THE NEW PRESSURES CREATED BY THE FUEL AND RAW MATERIAL CRISES FURTHER DISTORT THE PRESENT EUROPEAN IMAGE. FINALLY THERE IS THE UNCERTAINTY OVER THE EVOLUTION OF NEW EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE US.

13. GIVEN THESE GREAT IMPONDERABLES IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THERE ARE STRONG EUROPEAN TEMPTATIONS TO TAKE THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTENCE AND TO MAKE INCREASINGLY SUBSTANTIVE ACCOMODATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE FEEL THIS PULL STRONGLY IN THE MICROCOSM OF THIS CONFERENCE. THERE IS THE TEMPTATION, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPEAN CAPTIALS, TO USE CSCE AS WELL AS OTHER ISSUES TO CURRY BILATERAL FAVOR AT THE EXPENSE OF ALLIES; TO REFLECT THE COMMUNIST AFFINITIES OF SOME ELECTORATES; OR SIMPLY TO ASSUME, AS SOME DO, THAT WESTERN EUROPE IS DESTINED TO SLIDE FOR FEAR THAT THE US NO LONGER HAS THE WILL TO ACT WITH RESOLUTION. WHETHER OR NOT THE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03993 03 OF 03 282218Z

CSCE FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM, A STRUCTURE WHICH WILL CUT ACROSS THE TRADITIONAL EAST-WEST DIVIDING LINES, WILL SERVE PRIMARILY AS A VEHICLE FOR THESE NEGATIVE TENDENCIES, OR WILL INSTEAD SERVE BELANCED AND CONSTRUCTUIVE ENDS, INCLUDING THAT OF HOLDING THE SOVIETS TO THEIR CSCE PROMISES, WILL DEPEND ON THE CONTINUING STATE OF CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE ITSELF.

14. ON THIS SCORE, ONE SHOULD BY NO MEANS UNDERESTIMATE THE SUBSTANTIAL CORE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN FIRMNESS AND RESOLVE WHICH REMAINS INTACT, IN FACT, IT SEEMS TO US THAT THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A CERTAIN SIMULTANEOUS RENAISSANCE IN EUROPEAN ELAN, I.E. A MORE CONSCIOUS, IF STILL WEAK EFFORT TO LAY THE BASIS FOR A FUTURE WEST EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNITY, WITH RE-NEWED LINKS TO THE UNITED STATES. EVEN THE CSCE PRO-ESSS ITSELF HAS SERVED TO BOLSTER THIS SIDE OF EUROPE'S SCHEZOPHRENIC OUTLOOK:

FIRST, SOVIET NEGOTIATING TACTICS HAVE DRIVEN HOME SOME NEW LESSONS ABOUT MOSCOW'S VERSION OF "REAL-POLITIK".

SECONDLY, CSCE HAS BEEN THE FIRST REAL TEXT OF "EUROPE'S" COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATING ABILITY, WHILE

THEIR RECORD HAS BEEN FAR FROM PERFECT, THE EC-  
NINE IN PARTICULAR HAVE GROWN IN STATURE AS A  
POLITICAL GROUPING, BECAUSE THEY HAVE MANAGED,  
BY AND LARGE, TO MEET THE TEST OF SHAPING AND  
STICKING TO COMMONLY ARRIVED-AT POLITICAL  
POSITIONS IN CSCE.

THIRDLY, WHILE CSCE'S FOCUS IS ON DETENTE,  
IT HAS INEVITABLY ALSO SERVED TO STIMULATE NEW  
WESTERN EUROPEAN THINKING (PARTICULARLY IN FRANCE,  
GERMANY, THE BENELUX) ABOUT THE CONVERSE I.E.  
ON THE LIMITS OF DENTENTE DICTATED BY  
EUROPE'S OWN VITAL INTERESTS IN ITS FUTURE ORGAN-  
IZATIONAL ARRANGMENTS AND CONTINUING LINKS TO THE  
US.

15. IN SUM, THE CONTEXT IN WHICH CSCE WILL OPERATE AS  
A NEW PAN-EUROPEAN FACTOR IS FULL OF UNCERTAINTIES,  
ON THE RESOLUTION OF WHICH ITS ROLE AND ITS FUTURE UTILITY  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03993 03 OF 03 282218Z

FROM OUR VIEW POOINT WILL HEAVILY DEPEND. THIS RAISES  
KEY QUESTIONS AS TO THE ROLE THE US SHOULD PLAY IN  
THE COMING YEARS. THE LOW PROFILE WE HAVE ADOPTED IN  
EUROPE IN THE RECEPT PAST, PARTICULARLY HERE AT CSCE,  
HAS SERVED US WELL IN DIMINISHING UNNECESSARY ATMO-  
SPHERIC TENSIONS AND SUSPICIONS OF SUPER-POWER HEGEMONY.  
OUR SUPPORT FOR DENTENT E HAS AND WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO  
PAY SOME EUROPEAN DIVIDENDS. THE RETREAT FROM VIET-  
NAM DEFUSES ANOTHER MAJOR FRICTION AREA. INDEED, IF  
MATTERS COULD BE WORKED OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE  
STAGE MIGHT WELL BE SET FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE US-EUROPEAN  
RELATIONSHIP.

16 EUROPE, WE BELIEVE, CAN CONTINUE TO MAKE DO WITHOUT  
THE DAY-BY-DAY TYPE OF US LEADERSHIP OF AN EARLIER TIME.  
HOWEVER, BASIC US AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS ARE SO INTER-  
WOVEN, AND THE CONTESTING FORCES ARE SO EVENLY DIVIDED,  
THAT WESTERN EUROPE MAY WELL NOT SUCCEED IN REORDERING  
ITS COLLECTIVE AFFAIRS FOR THE LONG HAUL WITHOUT A  
CLEAR US POLICY LEAD ON THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS, PARTI-  
CULARLY AS TO OUR LONG-TERM VIEW OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL  
AND MILITARY INEGRATION, AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO  
ATLANTIC TIES.

17. THIS, IN OUR VIEW, IS THE MAJOR UNDERLYING PROBLEM  
WHICH THE EUROPEANS WILL NOT RESOLVE BY THEM-  
SELVES WITHOUT POLICY HELP FROM US. IF A STRONGER  
SELF-CONFIDENT WESTERN EUROPE CAN BE GIVEN NEW LIFE,  
WE BELIEVE THE NEGATIVE POTENTIAL OF THE LONGER-  
RANGE ROLE OF THE CSCE CAN BE CONTAINED, AND THE



ADVANTAGES, PRIMARILY OF BASKET III, MADE GOOD. CONVERSELY  
IN A DETERIOTATING SITUATION, IT COULD BE-  
COME A VEHICLE CONTRIBUTING TO UNCERTAINTY AND SOVIET  
INTERFERENCE.

DALE

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** COLLECTIVE SECURITY, POLICIES, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 28 MAY 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** CunninFX  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975GENEVA03993  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750187-0702  
**From:** GENEVA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750514/aaaaamkj.tel  
**Line Count:** 444  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** NOFORN  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 9  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** NOFORN  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** CunninFX  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 01 MAY 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <01 MAY 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <25 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CSCE: SOME THOUGHTS ON WHERE WE ARE GOING USNATO ALSO FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY  
**TAGS:** PFOR, XG, CSCE  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006